Explication of the Poem Insomnia by Dana Gioia Essay

Explication of the Poem Insomnia by Dana Gioia - Essay Example She talked about things that our senses begin to notice when we cannot sleep in the stillness of the night. The pipes clanking, water running in the dark etch was really just figures of speech that she is beginning to notice things she had learned to ignore. In this first stanza, the reader gets the idea that she is fidgety, uneasy and restless due to insomnia. In the second stanza, Dana Goia recalls her regrets. Things she does not want to think about but is forced to because she cannot sleep. Here, she realized that all that â€Å"she’ve worked for these past years, â€Å" were not really that important especially when she stated that it is now in the state of disrepair, the moving things about to become undone. She had twisted the sheets or forced to ignore all the things that could have made her happy because she did not allow herself to love, or did not love because she had material priorities which she realizes now as unimportant. She escalated this nostalgia in the third and last strophe as she regret the people she ignored or the opportunity to love evident with the many voices that escaped her until now. The venting furnace, the accusations of the clock was really all just figure of speech of her regrets. The furnace is her frustration that needs to be vented and the clock was the opportunity and time she wasted. And this moment of insomnia that gives her terrible clarity to recall all this is killing her. She would like to stay with the current trajectory of her life but this insomnia is forcing her to reflect, giving her useless insight that she does not want to think about. The poem used many metaphors that meant something else to illustrate the poet’s regret and disappointment that she does not want to think about but is forced to because of her insomnia. The use of powerful words and how they are arranged brings powerful message of the poet’s struggle, that she wanted to maintain her course but

Competition and Business Risk Assignment Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 2750 words

Competition and Business Risk - Assignment Example he individual reflective report will act as an overview of the strategies that were implemented by Head Start Footwear through the business strategy game (BSG) that was played from year 11 to year 15 on a period of 5 weeks. The major aim of this reflective report is be to make an evaluation of my knowledge of how to run a business by making use of the business strategy game. The report will also highlight how I used the Belbins typology to analyse my team members and myself, the theories that I have found helpful from other courses that studied on my masters programme, and what I have leant in relation to business strategy. Figures and facts retrieved from business strategy game will be provided to support the report’s arguments in the report such as the image rating and investor expectation as shown in the figure below. The business strategy game (BSG) offers me practice to make business decisions. The game also enables me to learn how to come up with strategies for winning in a highly competitive market. It also enables me to be held answerable for my actions, in comparison to the business managers who are held responsible for their firm’s performance in the real world (Thompson, Stappenbeck, & Reidenbach, 2013:33). The other benefit is that we can learn more of the BSG exercise by taking up a role a business expert attempting to attain the best organizational performance by making use of managerial prudence and responsible business approaches (Thompson, Stappenbeck, & Reidenbach, 2013:34). BSG gives the opportunity to put what I have learnt into action in order to gain some expertise in applying the skill of strategic analysis. I was able to access the most recent industry-wide developments, create a long-term direction for my company H, create and attain strategic financial goals, and lastly, I came up with ways of producing best results and possibly result to gaining some competitive advantage. Consequently, there the results for Head Start Footwear

Flood Measuring System Essay Example for Free

Flood Measuring System Essay

Air pollution control residues

Air pollution control residues INTRODUCTION Description of Overall Problem Air Pollution Control (APC) residues are the solid output of the flue gas treatment equipment installed on incinerators (this report refers specifically to APC Residues from incinerators handling Municipal Solid Waste MSW). They comprise the fly ash from incineration (middle and fine grades) together with the reagents (mainly lime and activated carbon) used in the flue gas treatment. Thus, they contain: Volatile contaminants from the original waste (inc chlorides, metals), Compounds created in the incineration process (inc dioxins), Further materials from the flue-gas treatment process (sulphates, together with high alkalinity). Therefore they are classified as hazardous waste. Approximately 170,000t/y (Technology Strategy Board 2009) of such residues are produced in the UK 3-4% of the total waste mass incinerated (Environment Agency, 2002). This tonnage is growing as more waste is incinerated to generate electricity and heat, and to reduce landfill. While increased energy recovery and reduced landfill are worthwhile in themselves, achieving them has created the problem of the hazardous APC residues. In the UK the prevalent destination for these residues has been landfill, but this option is under threat from tightening landfill Waste Acceptance Criteria, and rising landfill taxes, so new solutions are required. There are various treatment/recovery options available for APC residues. However these raise other concerns, primarily: Financial and energy cost of treatment Generation of further effluent Environmental impact of the treated waste Quality control of the recovered materials. Objectives and Scope The overall goal is to identify cost-effective management options for APC residues, within Waste Acceptance Criteria. The ultimate objectives of implementing such options are shown in Requirements (Appendix 1). For this study, the specific the objectives are: Briefly analyse the shortcomings of the existing methods of treatment and disposal of APC residue in landfills, along with the barriers in the UK for re-use of APC residues in various industries, such as cement aggregate, asphalt and ceramics. Propose energy- and cost-effective methods for the treatment of APC residue which reduce the leachability and amount of heavy metal/dioxins present. Also suggest a supplier of technology for each treatment method proposed. Compare the cost per tonne for each option, including treatment and disposal costs (including current and future landfill taxes), based on the hazardous classification of any remaining waste. Suggest potential re-use opportunities for materials recovered from the treatment process, indicating potential markets and revenues. The scope is focused on APC residues from municipal waste incineration. It is assumed that current incineration technology and operating conditions apply, with waste of current composition, resulting in residues of current composition. The objectives have been pursued in the context of current UK and EU regulation. This is explained in terms of the waste management hierarchy in table 1. Notes of Figure 1: Further processing leading to recovery may be in or outside the system boundary depending on whether the process is likely to be dedicated to this application. In either case the resulting wastestreams are inside the system boundary Landfill operations are outside the system boundary, but the long term leaching behaviour of all landfill waste will be considered, even if it meets WAC. Report structure This report has been structured to give an overall review of the management options for the Air Pollution Control residue, intended to provide a details of the findings related with work aiming to give recommendations on its treatment. Chapter 1. Background and scope. Chapter 2. Introduction to the residues, overview of major management strategies, legislative aspects, and environmental issues Chapter 3. Details on the residue treatment techniques, operation principles, and development status Chapter 4. Appraisal on the recovery and utilization techniques, operation principles, and development status. Chapter 5. Overview of status for available solutions, documentation level, assessment approach for environmental impacts, outline of important aspects for consideration, qualitative and quantitative comparison of each treatment processes. Chapter 6. Recommendations System Engineering Management Plan (SEMP) is listed in Appendix 2. This is an outline of system requirements and mechanisms for verifying whether the requirements are met. It will provide an overview to integrate different technical elements of the project. The plan will also describe the activities, processes and tools used to ensure an achievement of the project outcomes to the client and other stakeholders. Press Release is placed in Appendix 3 and this would form a basis of a publicity campaign for the project. MANAGEMENT AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR APC RESIDUE APC residues generation and characteristics APC residues come from the cleaning process of the gaseous emissions, which are produced during the incineration. Dry and semi-dry scrubber systems are used in the cleaning process and involve the injection of an alkaline material to remove acid gases, particulates and flue gas condensation (Sabbas et al. 2003). Finally, fabric filters in baghouses are used, where the fine particulates, i.e. the APC residues are focalized and removed from the gaseous emissions (Sabbas et al. 2003). It is estimated that APC residues represent 2-5% of the original waste on a wet basis and their production in the UK is approximately 128,000 tonnes per annum (Amutha Rani et al., 2008). In general, APC residues from municipal solid waste incineration (MSWI) consist of fly ash, carbon and lime and contain dioxins and furans (Amutha Rani et al., 2008). They are highly alkaline materials (pH 12.0-12.6) and they comprise significant concentration of heavy metals, salts and micro-pollutants (Sabbas et al. 2003 ). Depending on the initial waste composition, the incinerator and the air pollution control system, their composition may vary significantly (Amutha Rani et al., 2008). The typical range of APC residues composition is shown in table 2. The APC residues are characterized as hazardous wastes (190107*, according to the EWC) due to their chemical content and their impact on the environment, primarily by leaching. Regulatory Framework Introduction Regulations and legislation on waste management in the UK have evolved considerably over the years as a result of identification of new pollutants, public health and environmental concerns, economics and technological advancement (Pocklington, 1997 and McDougall et al, 2001). This assertion suggests that legislation and regulations play a major role in ensuring sustainable waste management. In addition, the establishment of legislation on waste management shows the radically changing perception of humans and communities towards the environmental impact of human activities (Pocklington, 1997). Today, regulations and legislation provide a framework for efficient handling of hazardous wastes such as APC residue. Amutha Rani et al (2008) observed that sustainable management of APC residues depend on the implementation of UK and EU waste management legislation. The Existing regulatory and legislative framework for managing APC residues in the UK About 80% of the environmental legislation in the UK have their origins in the European Commission laws (Pocklington, 1997). The existing legislative and regulatory framework for APC waste management in the UK and EU include: Waste Incineration Directive Integrated Pollution Control Directive Landfill Directive and ensuing waste acceptance criteria/procedure EA guidance on the classification of hazardous waste Water Framework Directive However, the discussion on the regulatory and legislative framework for this project focuses mainly on the UK Landfill directive and EA guidance on classification of hazardous wastes. These subjects are pertinent within the boundary of this project more so as Landfill disposal is common in the UK. Also IPPC directive is discussed briefly to highlight the roles public participation and deployment of best available techniques in meeting our objectives. The key objectives of these legislation and regulation are to: Reduce the amount of APC residue generated and improving the quality of exhaust gas (McDougall et al, 2001) Reduce the amount of APC going to Landfill (EA Guidance on landfill, 2006) Prevent environmental impact (ESA 2004) Reduce the risk of human harm (US National Research Council 2000, ESA 2004) This diagram illustrates the relationships between the established regulatory framework and stages in the APC management process. There is no specific legislation covering recovery or reclassification of APC residue in the UK (ESA 2004). Quina et al (2008) also points out that legislation for recycling APC has not yet been established in the UK. The Integrated Pollution Control Directive: Directive 2008/1/EC concerning integrated pollution prevention and control This Directive aims at establishing means to prevent or reduce emissions into air, water and land (IPPC, 2008). Hence this directive is crucial as it suggests various methods of incineration and treatment that could reduce the impact of APC residues on the environment during incineration, treatment or landfill. The IPPC Directive is based on four principles namely: Best Available Technique (BAT) Integrated waste management Flexibility Public participation The BAT refers to the most effective methods of operation that would reduce environmental impact and enhance results such as making residues from incineration less hazardous. In the BAT, optimizing resources and harnessing or saving energy are prioritized (Gargulas N. and Mentzis A, 2007). Also, the BAT is flexible and no terms are imposed since it recognizes that different conditions apply in different cases. The Best Available Techniques Reference (BREF) is a reference document on technical input needed to determine the BAT to be adopted. This BREF contains technical information on available means of treating APC residues such as sintering, vitrification, stabilization and solidification. This project has considered the BATs to APC treatment and these methods are discussed in chapter 3. However, there are no BATs available for landfills. Notwithstanding, Landfill operators and APC treatment plants require permits issued by the Environment Agency with public support to ensure that t here are no health or environmental impacts as a result of their activities (Macleod C. et al 2006 and IPPC 2008). The role of the public is crucial in this directive. Article 15 of the Directive, gives the public full privileges to participate in decision making processes leading to the issuance of permits for installation of plants, and for carrying out technical and administrative changes. This aspect is very important especially in the proper project planning and execution (see SEMP). Therefore the installations of APC treatment facilities and the method involved are tailored to meet public requirements as well as legislative requirements. All hazards inherent in operating APC treatment facilities shall be made known to the public in accordance to this directive. Also the outcome of compliance tests on treatment facilities with regard to environmental impact shall be made public (IPPC 2008). Thus, it can be argued that since the public are key stakeholders in this project, good public perception is needed in accordance with the IPPC directive to ensure sustainable management of APC residues. Environment Agency guidance on classification of hazardous waste The essence of this guidance is to distinguish different kinds of wastes based on their physical and chemical properties which include their toxicity or hazardous nature. The Hazardous Waste Directive (HWD), council directive 91/689/EC and the Revised European Waste Catalogue (EWC) form the regulatory framework for this guidance. The HWD aims at defining hazardous wastes to ensure the correct management and regulation of such waste (EA Hazardous Waste 2008, pg 5). This directive identifies 14 hazardous properties of wastes, thus hazardous wastes are classified H1 H14 according to their hazardous properties (EA, Hazardous waste 2008). The EWC code is derived from the industry and process producing the waste, and the type of waste (EA hazardous waste 2008). APC residues are categorized as hazardous wastes with absolute entry (Rani et al 2008 and ESA 2004). Under the European Waste Catalogue (EWC), APC residues fall under the category of wastes from incinerators (waste management facilities) that have a generic code 19. The specific code for solid wastes generated from gas treatment such as APC residues is 19 01 07. Wastes resulting from the treatment of the APC residues such as the partially stabilized APC residue, the vitrified material etc are also categorized as hazardous with absolute entry (EA hazardous waste 2008). However, when tests confirm that the constituents of treated waste have become less or non hazardous, they can be reclassified as hazardous wastes with mirror entry or non-hazardous as the case may be(EA Hazardous waste 2008). Solidified and partly stabilized wastes are coded 19 03 06 and 19 06 04 respectively with absolute entries, while vitrified wastes from flue gas treatment are assigned the code 19 04 02. The Landfill Directive 1999/31/EC of 26 April 1999 on the landfill of waste The primary objectives of the landfill directive are: To reduce waste going to landfill the prevent or minimize environmental impact as a result of waste disposal Stringent measures and standards have been set to reduce the burden and reliance on landfill (EA guidance on landfill, 2006). Landfills are classified into three categories: non-hazardous, inert and hazardous landfills (Landfill (England and Wales) Regulations, 2002) For APC residues, a key requirement in the Directive prior to landfill is to perform tests to determine its long term and short term leaching behaviour and to carry out treatment to reduce its toxicity (EA guidance on landfill, 2006). This project suggests that the need for treatment of APC residues augments the case for exploring potentials for recovery or reclassification of the residues. Article 6 c (iii) of the Directive reflects our aim to make APC residues at least stable non-reactive hazardous wastes (SNRHW) or completely non-hazardous through efficient treatment techniques such as vitrification, washing, stabilization and plasma technology. SNRHW are known to have low leaching potentials (EA guidance on landfill, 2006). Treated APC residues with leaching behaviour equivalent to those of non-hazardous waste can be disposed at designated non-hazardous landfill subject to meeting the relevant waste acceptance criteria (EA guidance on landfill, 2006 and Landfill (England and Wales) Regulation, 2002). APC residues must meet the waste acceptance criteria (WAC) for a designated landfill after treatment. Schedule 1 of the Landfill (England and Wales) (Amendment) Regulation 2004, stipulates the procedure and criteria for disposing or accepting waste at landfills. Waste Acceptance Criteria and Procedure The WAC is elaborately designed to deal with the technical requirement of wastes such as APC residues designated for landfills in the UK (England and Wales). It also aims at controlling the disposal of wastes into landfill which is a common practice in the UK. Technically, the WAC ensures that the numerical leaching characteristics of APC residue are determined prior to disposal at landfill (EA Guidance on Landfill 2006). Thus, after their mandatory treatment, APC residues must meet the relevant waste acceptance criteria before they are accepted into landfill. The leaching characteristics include: the elements and compounds in APC residue and their leaching properties (in mg/kg or L/S) and the hazardous nature of the APC residue (EA Guidance on Landfill, 2006). The Environment agency is responsible towards ensuring that the criteria for particular landfills are met. Preceding the WAC is the Waste acceptance procedure. The Waste acceptance procedure for APC requires basic characterization, compliance testing and on-site verification (EA Guidance on Landfill 2006). The basic characterization is done to determine the physical and chemical characteristics of the waste (EA Guidance on Landfill 2006). Incineration plants are responsible for carrying out the basic characterization of the APC residues since they produce the APC while the landfill operator ensures that compliance testing and on-site verification are done (EA Guidance 2006). Approved tests are defined in schedule1 part 2 of the landfill regulation 2004 and they include tests for determining treated APC composition and leaching behaviour. The compliance tests are carried out to verify if leaching limit levels predicted in the basic characterization are credible. Besides exploring opportunities for reuse of APC residues and recovery of valuable materials from the residues, this project also aims to treat APC residues to meet at least the waste acceptance criteria for SNRHW to enable disposal at a non-hazardous landfill. Amendment 14 of the Landfill (England and Wales) regulation 2004 states the criteria for disposing SNRHW in the non-hazardous landfill. Discussions There is no specific legislation on the reuse of wastes such as the APC residues in the UK. Notwithstanding, the UK without incineration network (www.ukwin.org.uk) tagged the use of fly ash and APC residues for construction works as irresponsible. Thus it can be suggested that re-use is implied in this clause as well. However, if it is well proven that APC residues can be managed sustainably without any long or short term environmental repercussions, it will pave way for debates to strengthen the existing regulatory frame and also re-focus the views of environmental activists toward the prospects in the residues. ESA report (2004) argues the provision of regulatory certainty by the government is necessary in enhancing investment towards sustainable management of APC residues. The report also suggests that investments will focus on reliable APC treatment technologies. There are several scientific developments for managing APC residues pioneered by waste management companies such as Techtronic in the UK. Environmental problems and management strategies Most of the APC residues (around 88%) (Environmental Agency, 2002) produced in the UK, are disposed of into landfills. During their disposal or any kind of utilization or handling, a number of environmental impacts can be caused. Dust and Gas emissions Dust emissions are represented as a potential risk, due to the size of the APC residues particles (0.001-1 mm) (Sabbas et al., 2003). Despite the easily dispersion of these fine particles, a survey by the Environmental Agency at a number of landfill sites in the UK testifies that their concentrations are within the recommended air quality objectives (Environmental Agency, 2002). Gas production is another potential environmental impact related to the disposal of APC residues. Gas is produced by metallic aluminum hydration (Sabbas et al., 2003) and because of that, some explosions have been reported (Sabbas et al., 2003). However, the production of gas is significantly lower compared to the production of the municipal solid waste landfills, due to their low biodegradable content of the APC residues. Leaching production The major environmental impact is the leaching production of APC residues The leaching behaviour of the elements present in APC residues is the main source of environmental concern. Leachates can cause pollution of soil, groundwater and surface water bodies. The leaching behavior of the APC residues is very complex and depends on a lot of parameters. The pH and the liquid to solid (L/S) ratio of the residues that will occur in the landfill site are important factors which affect determine their leaching behaviorbehaviour as well as the availability of the elements which are contained in the APC residues. The pH depends on the characteristics of the leaching fluid and the waste, i.e. APC residues, and is the key factor of many elements leachability. Leaching of most major elements (e.g. Al, Ca, S, Mg) and heavy metals (e.g. Cd, Pb, Zn) are strongly pH-dependent (Astrup et al., 2006). This dependency of the pH causes a significant difficulty on the prediction of the leaching behaviorbehaviour. Generally, APC residues carry on their pH in alkaline values for a long time (many thousands of years) (Astrup et al., 2006). However, their pH decreases as the time passes and the APC residues are washed by the infiltrating water (the neutralize capacity decreases) (Astrup et al., 2006). Thus, the prediction of the landfills pH and thereby the leaching behaviorbehaviour of the residues in over a long term period is complex. The L/S ratio represents the amount of the leachate that comes in contact with a given amount of APC residues (Sabbas et al. 2003 pp what page?) and depends on the characteristics of the APC residues and the climatic conditions, the hydrology and the hydrogeology of the area (Sabbas et al. 2003). Usually, as the time of disposal passes the value of the L/S ratio becomes higher for a particular application site. Due to this contact the properties of the waste as well as the leaching behaviorbehaviour of the waste change. Thus, the value of this ratio is a very important parameter for the leachate content. The availability for leaching is a parameter, which characterizes the particular waste and represents a fraction of the total content of contaminants in the waste itself (Sabbas et al. 2003). The typical values of the availability for the APC residues are shown in table 2 and they can provide a theoretical estimation of the maximum release of a contaminant in a period of 1000 to 10000 years (Sabbas et al. 2003). The prediction of the leaching behaviour and the evaluation of the environmental impact of APC residues are based on leaching tests. Leaching values for the APC residues arising from leaching test are summarized in table 4. The first leachate from APC residues is usually characterized from soluble salts (e.g. chlorides, hydroxides of calcium, sodium and potassium) and trace element such as Pb and Mo (Sabbas et al., 2003). Contrary to the high solubility of this elements, the solubility of toxic organic compounds is believed to be not high due to their hydrophobic nature and their low concentration in APC residues (from properly operated MSWI plants) (Sabbas et al., 2003). Long term leachate concentrations are usually lower than the initial or they may remain atto the same level. The only exceptions are the elements Al and Zn, which concentrations in the leachate are increase d inover a long term period (Astrup et al., 2006). As it is explained above the leaching behaviour of the APC residues depends on the environmental conditions and changes during the time of the disposal. Thus, an analytical prediction of the long term leaching behaviour is very difficult and it should be based on a combination of information on leaching principles, leaching tests, field measurements, simulation of mineral changes and speciation (Sabbas et al., 2003 page number pls). Due to the complexity of the long term leaching behaviour, the data available in literature are limited. Management of APC residues In the UK the disposal of any waste to landfill is regulated (see regulations section). Generally, the landfills are classified as suitable for hazardous, non-hazardous or inter wastes and, for each of these types of landfill, particular leaching limit values (Waste acceptance criteria, WAC) are defined and should be achieved for any waste are to be landfilled. Table 5 shows the leaching limit values (WAC) for the three types of landfill sites and if they are compared with the values in table 4, it becomes obvious that APC residues cannot be landfilled without a prior treatment. And non-hazardous waste deposited in the same cell. Either TOC or LOI must be used for hazardous wastes. UK PAH limit values are under development. Following the recent consultation exercise the UK Govt may review the limit values in tow years time (2006). If an inert waste does not meet the SO4 at L/S 10 limit, alternative limit values of 1500 mg/l SO4 at C2 (initial eluate from the percolation test) prEN 14,405 and 6000 mg/kg SO4 at L/S10 (either from percolation test or bach test BS EN 12457-3), can be used to demonstrate compliance with the acceptance criteria for inert wastes. The values for TDS can be used instead of the values for Cl and SO4. Or DOC at pH 7.5-8.0 and L/S 10 can be determined on pr EN 14429 (pH dependent test) eluates. Disposal to landfill (Amutha Rani et al., 2008) APC residues are mixed with wastewater to form a solidified product. During this treatment the residues react with the CO2 from the atmosphere reducing the pH to values between 8 and 9. This mixing also eliminates the dispersion of the APC residues particles. After this treatment, the APC residues reach the WAC and they are landfilled into monofill cells at a hazardous waste landfill. This process is used by a treatment plant in GloucesstershireGloucestershire, from which most of the APC residues treated by this method in the UK are coming. Storage in salt mines In this disposal method the APC residues are loaded in sealed capsules and pitted 170m below the surface (Amutha Rani et al., 2008). The disposal in salt mines can take place for a long term. They are characterized as well isolated, very dry, with stable atmosphere and natural gas-impermeable salt layers (Clement, 2000). Salt mine for this purpose is located in Cheshire, England, where a major percentage of the APC residues, produced in the UK, are stored (Amutha Rani et al., 2008). Use in waste acid treatment (Amutha Rani et al., 2008) Due to the mixing of waste acid (usually HCl) and APC residues, the lime content of the APC residues is convertedsed into less hazardous components (CaCl2) and the concentrations of Zn and Pb are reduced. Furthermore, the pH is at high levels, preventing the salts release. Thus, the final mixture from this process is non-hazardous and it is described as sludge from a physico/chemical treatment; it is classified as EWC code 190206 and can be disposed of in non-hazardous landfills. TREATMENT TECHNIQUES Ash Washing Process Description: The objective of Ash washing process is to extract a number of minerals from the APC residue obtained after Municipal Solid Waste incineration and thereby diminish the leachability of various compounds remaining in the residue. The process also aims to improve the quality of the residue obtained for further re-use applications or to reduce the overall content of waste going to the landfill. According to Quina et al (2001), ash washing, acid leaching, electro-chemical process and thermal treatment are some of the most widely used methods for extracting metal values from the APC residues. The separation techniques studied in this section are ash washing with MgSO4, bioleaching using Asphergillus niger fungi and leaching using extracting agents. Each process has different prerequisites, operation time and cost, objectives and risks associated with them. Ash Washing With MgSO4: Chimenos et al (2005) The process aims to apply the optimum parameters for washing APC residue by utilising minimum energy and water. This process uses multi-stage washing process to diminish the leaching of chloride and sulphate salts present in APC residue and thereby ensuring that the amount of harmful substance present in wastewater is reduced. The wastewater produced is recycled and re-used in the process using employing a rapid spray evaporation technique which runs on the waste heat produced from pumps, turbines and incineration furnace. Figure 3a showsrepresent the overall process diagram of operation. The research conducted by Zhang et al (2008) shows that the leachability of the heavy metals and chlorides present in APC residue depends on its pH level. The pH of the solution, when MgSO4 is added during the washing process, may be controlled by the formation of gypsum as shown in Eq(1). Ca(OH)2 + MgSO4 CaSO4 + Mg(OH)2..(1) Bioleaching Q.Wang et al (2009) This process is considered to be a biohydrometallurgical approach to extract heavy metals from APC residue. It is considered to be a green technology because of it makes use of the natural ability of microorganisms to break down solid compounds into soluble and extractable form by enzymatic oxidation or reduction. The process uses the acids secreted by Aspergillus niger fungi such as oxalic acid, citric acid and gluconic acids to extract the heavy metals present. Water-washing was is used as a pre-treatment before the bioleaching process to reduce the bio-leaching period from 30 to 20 days and to extract the maximum amount of chloride and sulphate salts. Figure 4 shows an overall process diagram for the bioleaching process. Bioleaching is a low cost and low energy consumption approach. Leaching Using Extracting Agents Fedje et al (2010) This process uses leaching agents other than water for extracting heavy metals like Zn and Pb. The efficiency of the extraction agent depends on heavy metals of interest, the concentration of the extracting solution, the pH and the liquid/Solid ratio used. The goal of the process is obtain a solution in which the concentrations are high enough to enable further separation or recovery. The leaching media used for this process are 3M HNO3 L/S = 5 0.1 M EDTA with pH adjustment L/S = 5 3M NH4NO3 L/S = 5 The choice of these leaching media was based on their ability to form a complex with metal ions. Table 6 compares the efficiency of the aforementioned leaching agent in extracting the heavy metals from APC residue. Figure 5 represents the overall process diagram. The most widespread leaching method used for APC residues is acidic leaching using strong mineral acids such as HCl and H2SO4. However, due to the high alkalinity of APC residues, large amounts of acids are needed which results in trouble with storage and handling. Moreover, the reaction of APC resid

Truman Scholarship Candidate :: essays research papers

The 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") has proven unsuccessful in its goal of empowering people with disabilities to enter the workforce. Although 19.4% of the population have some disability,1 they constitute only 4.3% of the workforce.2 The group's unemployment rate stands at almost 17%, nearly three times the national average.3 A survey for the National Organization on Disabilities found that current levels of employment of people with disabilities between the ages of 16 and 64 have actually dropped two percentage points since 1986, four years before the civil rights legislation was passed.4 The Social Security Administration has additionally reported a decline since 1990 in the percentage of disabled Americans who are working while receiving Supplemental Security Income ("SSI").5 Several factors account for these high levels of unemployment. Health insurance is perhaps the most significant. Disabled people receiving SSI or Social Security Disability Income ("SSDI") lose their federal health insurance if they earn more than $500 per month in income for nine months, a powerful incentive not to work.6 In turn, employers are wary of hiring people with disabilities for fear of driving up insurance premiums for their businesses. Secondly, a further disincentive to work exists in wages, where recipients of SSI or SSDI often earn more by not working. This is particularly true among the severely disabled, where most work available will pay only slightly more than minimum wage.7 Thirdly, ADA has yet to be properly enforced. Eight federal agencies are currently involved in the investigation of varied complaints,8 and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") lags ten months in its investigations of complaints.9 A visually impaired job hunter wrote in the New York Times that when he tried to file a complaint with EEOC, "I was told that my complaint would be kept on record and if a number of such complaints for the same employer accumulated, 'action would be taken.’"10 An additional factor in the high levels of unemployment among people with disabilities is business's lack of knowledge about ADA and the cost of meeting its provisions. Most disabled workers do not need any special accommodations,11 and only 22% of accommodations cost more than $1000. Sixty-seven percent of accommodations cost $500 or less.12 Furthermore, making new construction fully accessible increases costs by no more than one percent.13 Finally, employer prejudice and stereotypes about the disabled affect their employment. Myths persist that those with disabilities have lower attendance rates and safety records and are less capable of performing their jobs than their nondisabled counterparts, although studies have shown that disabled employees achieve similar levels of excellence in each of these categories.

Introducing the National Multiple Sclerosis Society into Singapore Essa

Introducing the National Multiple Sclerosis Society into Singapore The National Multiple Sclerosis Society is a non- profit organization that supports MS related research and provides programs for people with MS and their families. Multiple Sclerosis is an auto- immune disease. It is a chronic and often disabling disease that attacks the central nervous system. The mission statement of the National Multiple Sclerosis Society is to end the devastating effects of multiple sclerosis. The funds that are provided by the society are used in research, programs, and education. The Society helps to raise the awareness of Multiple Sclerosis around the world. (Reference 6) The Multiple Sclerosis Society is a worldwide organization that provides service to many different countries. One area of the world that the MS Society lacks in involvement is Southeastern Asia. MS does not appear in Asia nearly as much as in North America and Europe, but there are relevant cases. There are other parts of Asia such as Japan and India that have MS Societies. MS is also scarce in those areas and their societies are not as large as other chapters of NMSS, but it has been found that they are necessary. The Japanese society has 31 members and about 5000 people who have MS but are not involved in the society. In India the society has approximately 1005 members and 1000 people on record that have MS. (Reference 7) Putting a MS society in Southeastern Asia would be best suited in the country of Singapore. Singapore is a very prosperous country and has many international links. According to one source Chan Tse Chueen funding for non-profit organizations is very prevalent in Singapore. In Singapore there are three sources of funding. The first being the State that gives funds to social welfare organizations and research institutes. The government tries to encourage donations by pledging to match dollar – for- dollar that is raised. The second source is the corporate sector. Many corporations set up foundations and trust funds and also have donations as contribution in kinds. Companies in Singapore such as IBM Singapore and Hewlett Packard Company are dedicated to providing philanthropy to local organizations. The last source of funding is the civic sector. As the people of Singapore become more affluent more funds become available.(Reference 2) The marketing plan for NMSS in Singapore... ...n and benefit in that country. Conclusion Introducing the National Multiple Sclerosis Society into Singapore has its good sides and bad. The MS Society could benefit from the prosperous economy of Singapore and government and corporate support, but the factors that may not work are there may not be enough people in Singapore to benefit (not many with MS), also if societies are not exempt from taxes that may lead to financial problems for the society. Charities must incorporate the poor and societies are people who have common ends in this case Multiple Sclerosis. It would be difficult to change the MS society to a charity. It is certainly possible to introduce NMSS to other countries and many already have them. Even though NMSS in Singapore has its down side it might be able to work with some adaptation. References CIA World Fact Book 2000. http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/ Civicus. http://www.civicus.org/pages/singapihtml About HR. http://www.abouthr.com ChangeX: Currency Calculator. http://www.numa.com ExpatSingapore. http://www.expatsingapore.com National Multiple Sclerosis Society Fact Sheet World of Multiple Sclerosis. http://www.ifmss.org.uk/

Philosophy of the Mind Essay

Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason Introduction The Critique is a treatise on metaphysics. Kant defines metaphysics as â€Å"a speculative cognition that is wholly isolated and rises entirely above being instructed by experience. It is a cognition through mere concepts (not, like mathematics, cognition through the application of concepts to intuition), so that here reason is to be its own pupil† (xiv). This remark alone indicates that the attempt to answer the question â€Å"How is metaphysics as science possible?†, places the question of the bearing of our empirical judgments on objects qua ontologically independent. Patently, that does not imply that the transcendental deductions will not have any ultimate bearing on such issues. It means nothing more or less than that the transcendental deductions are concerned with the question of the mere possibility of pure a priori judgments – i.e., how it is possible that we are cognitively capable of making synthetic a priori judgments at all – as an independent problem in its own right. The results of the investigation would provide the basis for a subsequent series of investigations into the bearing such judgments have or could have on ontologically independent objects independent of perception and judgment of them. But it is a simple matter of first things first – let us first see what transpires when we attempt to draw on our indigenous cognitive resources alone. The treatise is accordingly a â€Å"propadeutic† and a â€Å"preparation† and a â€Å"treatise on the method† for an ultimate system of pure reason (xxii). The first Critique is about finding the mind in nature hence nature’s dependence on that mind. The second Critique then shows us what efficacy that mind can have in actively shaping at least one aspect of nature — the phenomenal self. Although, this shaping of the self through reason has a wider impact in that through freedom, we gain a new perspective on the entire phenomenal world, the world of nature and value. That said, it is not a small matter to describe in such specificity and detail the particular faculties or powers of the mind. It seems plausible that by granting a mind-dependent nature, a different accounting for that nature could be constructed; the mind and its faculties could be sliced and diced in different ways than does Kant, although then we would be different creatures entirely — something Kant does not rule out. (For Kant, clearly, a creature with a different mental make-up could experience a different nature from the same things-in-themselves.) Given his particular recipe for the mind, Kant’s theory of freedom and morality reveals numerous things we can say about the faculty of reason. Kant begins by setting reason, which is not merely a receptive but an active faculty, apart from everything to do with physical or sensory matter, but he must ultimately find a way to unite it with matter, in the form of experience, in order for there to be freedom since, perhaps oddly, freedom as we think of it can only exist in the context of its lack — determinism. That we might see these realms as disparate only reflects a failure to take Kant’s mind-dependent construction of nature at its word. The answer to many of the apparent impossibilities many find in Kant’s theory of freedom is to see freedom not as an attempt to marry freedom and nature, but rather to marry reason (as author of freedom) and the understanding (as author of nature). Through reason’s law-imposing nature emerge moral entities — indeed, a phenomenal moral realm — and through the understanding (and sensation) emerge objects of nature — a realm of nature. If we take nature (as we experience it) as in any way a given, or even if mind-dependent, as somehow prior to freedom, the impossibilities are impossible to avoid. An Intelligible Faculty Understanding, reason and judgment are most often described, as faculties, that is, as faculties of the mind. Kant appears to distinguish between the passive (sensibility), the empirically conditioned but active (understanding) and the unconditionally active (reason). (575) From this we see that reason is unique among the faculties as being both wholly intelligible and active. Immediately we also see that, from one point of view, the problem of freedom is simply the problem of reason: how can an unconditionally active mental power that is outside space and time be efficacious with respect to that which is in time? How can the purely rational mind cause something? â€Å"Pure reason,† Kant writes, is â€Å"a purely intelligible faculty [that] is not subject to the form of time.† (579) As such, we can have no direct experience of it — other than the bare awareness found in the Fact of Reason. (Our psychological experience of ourselves is as appearances, not as things in themselves.) Pure practical reason is what comprises the intelligible will because it is the faculty that underlies all maxims (or actions) determining that will. Although it is law-giving (this is how it is active), it does not impose particular laws, that is, laws with empirical content, for to do so would remove its purely intelligible and a priori status. Rather, all it can offer is the form of a law. We see an example of this in the Categorical Imperative, with its admonition to test a maxim by universalizing it. It could perhaps be argued that reason simply is the intelligible will; or rather, that the intelligible will is reason. Yet the foundation of freedom, as Kant frequently points out, lies in the noumenal realm of which we can cognize nothing. Only pure practical reason can fit the bill with respect to freedom (Neiman, 1994, p.62-7). Logical Reasoning How does the reason we encounter in its logical guise lead to the reason that produces the problem of freedom, and the other troublesome ideas of the Dialectic? Reason’s logical role as the faculty of inference is perhaps its most celebrated aspect. Here, as elsewhere, its raw material is not the empirical object/sensory manifold but the unifying law or principle that, through inference, reveals some knowledge of an object to us, for example, in the simple syllogism.[1] Kant uses this kind of reasoning from which to extract reason’s guiding principle — its primary characteristic. He argues that â€Å"in inference, reason endeavors to reduce the varied and manifold knowledge obtained through the understanding to the smallest number of principles,† (361) revealing that reason is seeking â€Å"the highest possible unity,† but that this is â€Å"not the unity of a possible experience, but is essentially different from such unity, which is that of understanding.† (363) He ultimately reaches the following principle of reason: â€Å"to find for the conditioned knowledge obtained through the understanding the unconditioned whereby its unity is brought to completion.† Thus, Kant has traced the genesis of the â€Å"supreme principle of pure reason† that ultimately yields the transcendental ideas, and distinguishes reason’s role from that of the understanding (373). This also lies at the basis of Kant’s distinction between reason’s logical and transcendental, or â€Å"real,† use where reason is a the source of concepts and principles â€Å"which it does not borrow either from the sense or from the understanding.† (356) It is this principle of reason and what it yields that Kant then spends the major part of the Dialectic testing and examining, concluding that the principle itself appears sound, but warning of its seemingly unavoidable misuse. His way out, ultimately, is to fall back on the regulative-constitutive distinction: Thus pure reason, which at first seemed to promise nothing less than the extension of knowledge beyond all limits of experience, contains, if properly understood, nothing but regulative principles†¦But if†¦they be misunderstood, and treated as constitutive principles of the transcendent knowledge, they give rise, by a dazzling and deceptive illusion, to persuasion and a merely fictitious knowledge, and therewith to contradictions and eternal disputes. (730) As we have already seen, this seemingly intractable position is itself resolved in favor of freedom via another distinction that is tightly linked to (if not emerges out of) constitutivity-regulativity — that between theoretical and practical — which reintroduces the possibility of a valid use of constitutive reason. In the entire faculty of reason only the practical can provide us with the means for going beyond the sensible world and provide cognitions of a supersensible order and connection, which, however, just because of this can be extended only so far as is directly necessary for pure practical purposes. (706) Thus pure practical reason’s principle takes in us the form of the moral law as the ultimate principle that strives systematize and unify our rules of action (our maxims), just as it sought to unify the rules of nature. And, like the principle we found to be at the root of logical reasoning, this law lies a priori in pure practical reason. Pure or Absolute Spontaneity Kant frequently describes freedom as pure or absolute spontaneity. He also ties freedom to reason and reason to spontaneity. As Kant also points out here, the understanding, as reason’s close cousin, if not identical twin, is also a faculty of spontaneity, but it is one that is limited by the requirements of possible experience and so applies itself to appearances. For the understanding, that which is given (sense, sensation) drives the production of nature, and the understanding’s spontaneity is what allows us to think any object of cognition, regardless of its actuality.[2] Thus, the understanding, which gives us nature, does not and cannot suffice to give us freedom precisely because it is too shackled to sensation and experience. For reason, unrestricted in the practical realm by the â€Å"is,† allows us to create moral entities (through creating the morally situated self), that is, reason as law-giving, as pure spontaneity is also freedom. A Given Nature Among the things that Kant’s various descriptions of reason tell us, is that it has a certain nature (that is, characteristics or features) that endows it with inevitable tendencies or drives. We become aware of these faculties or powers through what we do, and what and how we think, and of course we act and think by virtue of the faculties. (574) This nature appears to be given and, as such, it seems (at least from what Kant says of it) that it cannot be further explained nor analyzed. Of course, this nature is essentially our nature as rational beings. Kant frequently appeals to the nature of reason in explaining why it is that we seem always and everywhere inevitably ask the questions we ask (and draw the often erroneous conclusions we tend to draw about the world): There has always existed in the world, and there will always continue to exist, some kind of metaphysics, and with it the dialectic that is natural to pure reason. (xxxi) They [transcendental ideas] are not arbitrarily invented; they are imposed by the very nature of reason itself, and therefore stand in necessary relation to the whole employment of understanding. (384) Guyer finds Kant’s appeal to nature with respect to reason problematic, arguing that that â€Å"idea that our freedom itself is actually a product of nature† is paradoxical because â€Å"what is merely natural is precisely what would seem to be unfree rather than free.† (2000, p.375) Conclusion Kant insists that freedom has a central role in his philosophy; that freedom and its metaphysics are wholly bound up with the metaphysics of nature; and that at the root of both is the mind. Kant’s Critical corpus is built on the fact of our having minds composed of certain faculties or powers, passive (receptive) and active (spontaneous or even causal), which Kant analyzes based on the manner and matter of the experiences they yield us. Clearly, even if everything about reason upon which my case for understanding Kantian freedom is based is true, what seem to be antecedent assumptions about the mind and its faculties arguably remain unproven, and perhaps improvable. Since so much of what Kant argues makes up the mind is labeled intelligible — the faculty of reason for one — it seems we are still left, at the end of the day, with an even more crippling Kantian unknowability than that met with earlier. This unknowability covers that which is the foundation of the theory, and Kant could be accused of being more dogmatic than the dogmatists in asserting such a starting point. Yet, on another view, there are no â€Å"antecedent assumptions† in Kant’s theory about the mind, since it is precisely the make-up of the mind that the critical system is intended to uncover. This is at least part of Kant’s point when he argues we must consider having objects conform to our faculties of cognition, rather than the other way around — his famous second Copernican revolution (xvi-xvii). On that view, nature is a reflection of the mind, and so an investigation of nature is for Kant simply an investigation of the mind. The Hume: Mitigated Skepticism and Skeptical Conclusions Introduction Hume’s biographer, Ernest Mossner, offers this pertinent insight on Hume’s religious skepticism: How can we recognize [Hume’s] personal convictions on religion? The answer is plainly that we cannot—certainly not without considerable effort on our part and even then not definitively. The conclusions of a sceptic—even a mitigated sceptic—cannot be summarized in a one-two-three pattern or creed if for no other reason than that a sceptic, unlike other types of philosophers, is not altogether stable in his thinking, is perpetually rethinking his principles. Scepticism, first and last, is a frame of mind, neither a collection nor a system of doctrines. (Mossner, 1976, p.5) This section will demonstrate just how restless and inquiring Hume’s skepticism was in his An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. In the Enquiry’s first section, Hume compares those who attempt to indoctrinate their religious dogmas to thieves who are unable to win a fair fight (that is, honestly persuade men to believe their delusive message) and who will then hide behind superstitious â€Å"intangling brambles to cover and protect their weakness.† Chaced from the open country, these robbers fly into the forest, and lie in wait to break in upon every unguarded avenue of the mind, and overwhelm it with religious fears and prejudices. (i, 11) Hume concludes the Enquiry’s first section by expressing the hope (indeed his intent) that his philosophical skepticism â€Å"can undermine the foundations of an abstruse philosophy, which seems to have hitherto served only as a shelter to superstition, and a cover to absurdity and error.† (i, 16) Although Hume is always careful to state that he is fighting dogmatism and â€Å"religious superstition†, it is not difficult to see that in the early sections of the Enquiry this amounts to anyone who believes that they possess knowledge of God. The easiest way to see the Enquiry’s skeptical pattern of reasoning is to see that Hume wages war on religious dogmatism on two fronts. The first front is in the early sections of the Enquiry where Hume will mount a general assault on abstruse metaphysics and dogmatic theology with his account of â€Å"true metaphysics† (i, 12), which is an understanding and application of the general principles of human nature. The second front is in sections x and xi where Hume launches particular attacks on theistic bastions of revelation and natural theology. General Assault: True Metaphysics We must first determine whether God is a possible object for human understanding. The first test for the idea of God is â€Å"from what impression is that supposed idea derived?† (ii, 22) The answer must be â€Å"none†, for we can find no vivid and forceful impression corresponding to that abstract and complex idea, â€Å"God†. Thus, if God’s existence is an â€Å"object of human reason or enquiry† (iv, 25) then God’s existence must either be a relation of ideas or a matter of fact. Clearly, God’s existence is not a â€Å"Proposition†¦ discoverable by the mere operation of thought, without dependence on what is anywhere existent in the universe† (iv, 25). God is a being—indeed the Supreme Being—so if God exists. His existence must be a matter of fact. â€Å"All reasonings concerning matter of fact seem to be founded on the relation of Cause and Effect.† (iv, 26) Knowledge of God (the original cause) thus must arise from causal knowledge. For Hume there are only two types of causes: particular and general causes. So God, the original cause, must either be first particular cause or the highest general cause or principle. Particular causes are the constant conjunction of two species of objects found in phenomena. God’s uniqueness precludes the possibility that God can be a particular cause: It is only when two species of objects are found to be constantly conjoined, that we can infer the one from the other and were an effect presented, which was entirely singular, and could not be comprehended under any known species [i.e.. Nature] I do not see, that we could form any conjecture or inference at all concerning its cause [i.e., God]. If experience and observation and analogy be, indeed, the only guides which we can reasonably follow in inferences of this nature; both the effect and cause must bear a similarity and resemblance to other effects and causes, which we know, and which we have found, I many instances, to be conjoined with each other. (xi, 148) In the Enquiry Hume also rejects as impossible a knowledge of God, the ultimate general cause or principle: It is confessed, that the utmost effort of human reason is to reduce the principles, productive of natural phenomena, to a greater simplicity, and to resolve the many particular effects into a few general causes, by means of reasonings from analogy, experience, and observation†¦ Elasticity, gravity, cohesion of parts, communication of motion by impulse; these are probably the ultimate causes and principles which we shall ever discover in nature; and we may esteem ourselves sufficiently happy, if by accurate enquiry and reasoning, we can trace up the particular phenomena to, or near to, these general principles. (iv, 30) Hume limits the human understanding to knowledge of common life and experience (xii, 162). Clearly, however, God transcends human experience, so God cannot be an object of the understanding. Since the idea of God does not arise from the understanding, it must arise from some other faculty. Hume analyzes the idea of â€Å"God† (an infinitely powerful, wise and just entity) and shows that â€Å"God† is generated by the imagination through reflecting on human capacities and faculties and expanding them infinitely (ii, 19; and vii, 72). Hume’s general assault is directed against speculative metaphysics and dogmatic theology, which believes that God can be known by humans. And nothing can be more requisite than to enter upon the enterprize with thorough care and attention; that, if it lie within the compass of human understanding, it may at last be happily achieved; if not, it may, however, be rejected with some confidence and security. (i, 15) Particular Arguments for Theism From a religious viewpoint, Hume’s â€Å"true metaphysics† can be read as an assault on any dogmatic belief in God. In Enquiry sections x and xi Hume focuses his attack specifically on Theism (or one could be even more specific and say â€Å"Christianity†). In these two sections, Hume mounts an attack on the two pillars of Christianity: revelation and natural theology. Hume argues that neither revelation (reports of miracles) nor natural theology (the Design argument) can yield a belief in God that a reasonable man would assent to. By â€Å"reasonable man† here, Hume means the man who follows his â€Å"natural unprejudiced reason, without the delusive glosses of superstition and false religion† (x). As it can be seen from Hume’s argument in Enquiry x, he attempts to undermine the reasonableness of a belief in reported miracles1 using four lines of reasoning. First, â€Å"miracles† are violation of laws of nature. Any belief-system (secular or religious) must take as its foundation that there are inviolable laws of nature. Therefore, it is inconsistent to have a belief-system that is based on the testimony of miraculous events occurring. Miracles can thus never serve as the rational foundation for any belief system. Second, even if we knew miracles occurred, this would only establish a supematural entity who through â€Å"particular volitions† intervenes in nature and history. But miraculous events are useless in establishing what kind of supernatural power (or powers) it is that caused such events. This argument cannot establish whether the supernatural power is wise, foolish, or capricious. Or for that matter, this argument cannot establish that this supernatural power is God (the original cause and sustainer of the world). Third, admitting miracles based on testimony is self-defeating for theism. Other non-theistic and counter-theistic religions (the Gnostics, for example, who hold the creator is malevolent) also have miraculous testimonies that have as much claim to belief as reported Theistic miracles. Fourth, Theists who build their faith on miracles have it backwards: miracles can never justify religious faith. Rather, it is religious faith that justifies a belief in miracles. Section x arrives at a skeptical conclusion: we cannot know if a miraculous violation of law of nature occurred, and even if we could know they did occur such events could never be the foundation for a belief system such as Theism. In Section xi, Hume attacks the second pillar of theism, natural theology or reason’s attempt to understand God unaided by revelation. Hume’s argument against the Design argument of natural theology occurs in two levels: the first level is given by â€Å"the friend who loves skeptical paradoxes† (xi, 132) who draws out the consequences of accepting the Design argument. Let us grant (the â€Å"friend† argues) that there is a Divine Architect who designed nature. Humans can infer the nature or essence of this Architect only by carefully studying the design or order in the Architect’s creation, Nature. Has the Divine Architect designed this world in a way that a moral agent (one who is benevolent and just) would have designed it? The numerous gratuitous evils we discover in our world that appear unnecessary and unavoidable block us from inferring that the designer of our world is a benevolent and just moral agent. The second level of argument against natural theology is given by Hume himself, in his own voice. Whereas the first level granted the Design argument and drew out the anti-theistic consequences of the Design argument; in the second level Hume argues that there are compelling reasons against granting the Design argument. Because we discover a design in our world does not allow us to infer the existence of a designing intelligence. To put this point in another way: this argument states that because there is a causal order in our world, there must have been an original cause, God. But our knowledge of causation is only through experienced constant conjunction between two species of objects. We expect objects of type x to bring about changes in objects of type y because we have experienced this many times in the past. However, the original cause, God, is unique. Therefore we cannot make the required jump which is required by the Design argument that because there is causal order or design in our world there must be an original cause or designer (xi, 148). Faith in the Enquiry The outcome of both Hume’s general account of â€Å"true metaphysics† as well as his particular arguments against miracles and natural theology are skeptical. On the basis of reason we have no grounds to assent to God. Thus, if one assents to God, this assent is based not on reason but on faith: Divinity or Theology, as it proves the existence of a Deity, is composed partly of reasonings concerning particular, partly concerning general facts. It has a foundation in reason, so far as it is supported by experience. But its best and most solid foundation is faith, and divine revelation. (xii, 165). To draw the implication here, since Hume has shown in section xi that God has no foundation in reason or experience, a belief in God is therefore founded totally on faith. Hume’s appeals to faith in the Enquiry should be taken seriously and not regarded as sarcastic asides. We must understand that for Hume faith is a domain entirely outside of natural reason (i.e., understanding): And whoever is moved by faith to assent to it (the Christian Religion) is conscious of a continued miracle in his own person, which subverts all the principles of his understanding, and gives him a determination to believe what is most contrary to custom and experience. (x, 131) Hume’s argument is intended to show that a belief in God is, literally, unreasonable: it is outside the domain of reason. Hume is not endorsing faith, but pointing out the status of belief in God. One who accepts Hume’s position on God in the Enquiry recognizes that a belief in God, since it is unsupported by reason, must float in mid-air as if by a sorcerer’s trick. Some theists will face up to this consequence of theistic belief. But for most theists, upon realizing that their belief in God in unsupported by reason, their faith will come crashing down. Conclusion The Enquiry carefully lays out a program of Mitigated Skepticism: all knowledge must be limited to experience and common life. In his general account of â€Å"true metaphysics† Hume shows that given the weakness and limits of human nature, knowledge of God is impossible.   Then in his particular arguments of x and xi, Hume shows that neither reports of miracles (revelation) nor natural theology (reason) provide support for the theistic God. Hume’s aim in the Enquiry was skeptical or â€Å"agnostic†. A century before T.H. Huxley coined the term, in the Enquiry Hume wrote the first agnostic manifesto (Mossner). Comparison and Contrast Hume’s conception of reason and the role it plays are widely disputed, but enough can be agreed upon to at this stage make the points, in particular, that a feeling- or passion-based reason does not allow non-instrumental freedom. Korsgaard notes that Hume discusses several varieties of reason, but says that â€Å"Hume seems to say simply that all reasoning that has a motivational influence must start from a passion, that being the only possible source of motivation, and must proceed to the means to satisfy that passion, that being the only operation of reason that transmits motivational force.† (1996, p.314).   Onora O’Neill argues that for Kant, there can be no such thing as a merely instrumental reasoner: â€Å"Not only does he deny that reason is or ought to be the slave of the passions; he actually insists that there are and can be no merely instrumental reasoners.† (1989, p.52) Before looking at the differences, it is as well to point out what Kant and Hume have in common with respect to reason and cause. Both are trying to grapple with a similar tension — between reason as the fount of what can be known with certainty as set against the metaphysical tangles into which it so often leads us (manifest, for example, in antinomies for Kant and discussions of the infinite divisibility of space and time for Hume). In the end, Kant resolves this tension with his account of the roles of the faculties, particularly in the construction of knowledge, with an a priori reason and a distinction between reason as acting regulatively with respect to cognition and constitutively in the moral realm. In this, he sees reason as an unconditionally active faculty. Hume, on the contrary, while acknowledging the tension, holds that ultimately it cannot be resolved, and that while we continue to debate issues such as whether or not reason has efficacy or dominance over the passions, we will to all intents and purposes remain in nature’s leading rein. And, for Hume, reason is passive, inert. For both thinkers, reason has a nature or tendency that drives our thinking with a certain inevitability. Kant, as we have seen, frequently refers to reason’s â€Å"nature,† while Hume describes it in terms of instinct. In the end, though, their differences far outweigh what they share. For Hume, reason is subordinate to experience in a way that for Kant it is not, indeed cannot be. And this is where the contrast gains particular relevance with respect to freedom. Simon Blackburn describes it this way: Reason can inform us of the facts of the case. †¦ And it can inform us which actions are likely to cause which upshots. But beyond that, it is silent. The imprudent person, or the person of unbridled lust, malevolence, or sloth is bad, of course. We may even call them unreasonable, but in a sense that Hume considers improper. For, more accurately, it is not their reason that is at fault, but their passions. (1998, p.239) Hume considers several species of reason, for example demonstrative versus probable reasoning, and it is difficult to describe and choose one that can be considered the Humean or â€Å"empiricist† counterpart to Kantian reason.   In addition to his view of reason in general, Hume is quite specific in ruling out the possibility that such reason can in any way ground morality, and so it clearly cannot ground the kind of freedom we find in Kant. Consider Kant’s famous confession, that it was Hume’s critique of causality that woke him from his â€Å"dogmatic slumber†. Now, it seems to me that the significance of this remark is completely lost if it is thought to license a reading of the Critique as a ‘refutation of Hume’, that the Analogies are attempting to restore the epistemic foundation for Newtonian physics that Hume’s critique of causality had undermined, etc. As Kant explicitly states, what was for him significant about Hume’s critique of causality is that it was the thin end of a very large wedge, and a gateway into a vastly greater problem. Kant, in short, begins his investigation by agreeing with Hume’s conclusions regarding causality, but then goes further, formulating the problem in its most general form and then determining its corollaries with absolute rigor. Kant attests to the legitimacy of Hume’s critique of causality – for him Hume has incontrovertibly demonstrated that an a priori concept cannot be derived from a series of particulars. Accepting Hume’s conclusion, Kant then raises the next question: what, then, is the origin of such concepts? The skeptical conclusions Hume draws are, Kant contends, the result of his having considered â€Å"not the whole of his problem, but a part, which by itself can give us no information†. In sum, rather than presenting an alternative program, we see that by his own admission Kant sought to elaborate on, to extend and probe in greater depth the same process of rational self-scrutiny that Hume had begun. His objective was not to refute but to develop Hume’s insight by grasping the entire problem of which Hume considered only a particular instance. What, then, is Hume’s problem considered in its most general form? Kant’s remarks indicate that, for him, the generalized version of Hume’s problem is the problem of the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments – i.e., Kant’s generalization of Hume’s problem is the question of the possibility of a scientific metaphysics. Since Hume had shown that a priori concepts do not originate in experience, for Kant the resolution of the problem requires demonstrating the way in which all such concepts â€Å"spring from the pure understanding† While Hume had discovered a mere instance of the way in which in â€Å"judgments of a certain kind we go beyond our concept of the object† (Kant, p.792), we are required to examine what is common to the entire range of   such judgments.   Hume did not grasp the general problem since â€Å"he did not systematically survey all the kinds of a priori synthesis of understanding† (795). It is such a systematic survey, and an attempt to identify what they all have in common in order to consider the general phenomenon of our employing concepts that exceed the empirical content provided a posteriori as a single problem. Kant tells us is nothing other than â€Å"the working out of Hume’s problem in its greatest possible expansion†. The following definitions are submitted accordingly: a) Hume’s insight: Judgments about causality employ a concept that claims universal validity. But a concept derived from a series of particular instances cannot be universally valid. b) Kant’s generalization of Hume’s insight: We employ a range of concepts that claim universal validity. Each concept moreover presupposes an idea of universality as such.   No such concepts can originate from the particular instances perceived by the senses. Therefore, none of our ideas claiming universal validity, nor the idea of universality as such, can be derived from the particular instances perceived by the senses. Thus, for Kant, the general problem instantiated by Hume’s critique of causality is the following: c) Hume’s Point: No conception of universality, qua conception of universality, can be derived from empirical input in general. Our synthetic a priori judgments thus employ concepts whose content cannot be derived from experience. But there is more to the problem than this for Kant, since his question concerns not only the concepts that such judgments employ, but the very possibility of our making such judgments. Kant’s formulation of his central question thus covers not only the concepts that are employed in the judgments, but also the judgment considered as an act, as a cognitive process and achievement. The question of the very possibility of synthetic a priori judgments thus encompasses not only the question of how it is possible that we could make a judgment that makes so much as a mere claim to universal validity (given Hume’s Point), but also the problem of our cognitive capability to execute the act that employs such concepts. The reader should expect, as Kant states in the Introduction, a â€Å"critique of our power of pure reason itself† (27). Kant’s transcendental deductions are employed in an attempt to derive the necessary conditions of possibility our cognitive constitution must independently fulfill in order to account for the mere capacity to employ universal concepts in judgments that we in fact possess. Since, by Hume’s Point, universal concepts by definition cannot be derived from empirical content, we must attempt to discern what is contributed to empirical experience and judgment by the pure principles of subjectivity, considered in utter isolation from empirical input as such. References Blackburn, Simon (1998). Ruling Passions A Theory of Practical Reasoning. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Guyer, Paul. (2000). Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hume, David. (1976). Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Edited by LA. Selby-Bigge, revised by P.H. Nidditch. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason. Trans. Norman Kemp Smith. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1965. Korsgaard, Christine M. (1996). Creating the Kingdom of Ends. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mossner, Ernest Campbell. (1980). The Life of David Hume (2nd edition). Oxford: Clarendon Press,. Neiman, Susan. (1994) The Unity of Reason, New York: Oxford University Press. O’Neill, Onora. (1989). Constructions of Reason Explorations of Kant’s Practical Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [1]   â€Å"Reason, considered as the faculty of a certain logical form of knowledge, is the faculty of inferring, i.e., judging mediately (by subsumption of the condition of a possible judgment under the condition of a given judgment.)† (386); â€Å"Every syllogism is a mode of deducing knowledge from a principle.† (357) [2]   â€Å"If the receptivity of our mind, its power of receiving representations in so far as it is in any wise affected, is to be entitled sensibility, then the mind’s power of producing representations from itself, the spontaneity of knowledge, should be called the understanding.† (75)